Google tells Android devs: Your sensitive clipboard data is your problem, not ours.

Google's Android security documentation places the burden of protecting sensitive clipboard data entirely on app developers, while acknowledging that other apps can be potential 'threat actors.' The system provides a flag, `ClipDescription.EXTRA_IS_SENSITIVE`, that visually obfuscates copied text in keyboard previews to prevent shoulder surfing or screen capture by malicious apps. However, the actual clipboard content remains plainly accessible to any application that can bypass the background access restrictions implemented since Android 10.

This creates a dangerous illusion of security. Apps like Google's own Authenticator use the flag to hide MFA codes from prying eyes, but the underlying secret is still exposed in memory. Google's approach frames security as a developer checklist item rather than a systemic guarantee, leaving a gap where sensitive passwords, API keys, and authentication codes copied between apps can be silently harvested. The takeaway: Android's clipboard 'security' is a visual band-aid over a fundamentally leaky data channel.